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ESSAY
THE COMING SHOWDOWN OVER UNIVERSITY
ENDOWMENTS: ENLISTING THE DONORS
Sarah E. Waldeck*
This Essay focuses on the discordance between universities with
particularly large endowments and what is occurring in the rest of higher
education, particularly with respect to skyrocketing tuition and a growing
institutional wealth gap. The Essay considers absolute endowment values,
the amount of endowment per student, and expense-endowment ratios at
sixty private universities. It concludes that a small number of schools have
an excess endowment, and then provides a convenient proxy for
determining when an endowment is so large that it should receive less
preferential tax treatment. The Essay then considers the effects that large
endowments have at their home institutions and throughout higher
education, the arguments in defense of large endowments, and some
frequently proposed modifications to the tax code. The Essay recommends
that policymakers modify the charitable deduction for gifts to universities
with mega-endowments, as part of a multifaceted effort to spur endowment
spending and control tuition.
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INTRODUCTION
What a difference twelve months can make. When this Essay was first
submitted to the Fordham Law Review, educational institutions were having
a financial heyday. In 2007, 76 universities had endowments in excess of
one billion dollars, up from 62 in 2006.1 Schools with billion dollar
endowments saw record returns on their investments, with an average rate
of 21.3%.2 More than 25 institutions were in the midst of capital
campaigns that sought to raise a billion dollars or more. 3 At these fortunate
and elite universities, the coffers were substantial and still growing.
Unfortunately, however, university endowments are not immune to the
financial crisis. In January 2009, Princeton University announced that its
endowment, valued at $15.8 billion in March 2008, was expected to lose
25% of its value by the end of the fiscal year.4 In December 2008, Yale
announced that its endowment had declined an estimated 25% since June
2008, leaving an approximate total value of $17 billion.5 To add insult to
market injury, Yeshiva University (which has had a 28% drop in its
1. NAT'L ASS'N OF COLL. & UNIv. Bus. OFFICERS, 2007 NACUBO ENDOWMENT
STUDY, at ix (2008) [hereinafter 2007 ENDOWMENT STUDY] (on file with author), available
at http://www.nacubo.org (for a fee). This Essay uses the terms "university," "college," and
"school" interchangeably.
2. Id. at 4.
3. Brennen Jensen, Three Universities Seek $3-Billion or More, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 12, 2006, at B18.
4. Kate Zernike, Princeton Loses 11 Percent of Endowment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009,
at A13.
5. Posting of Dave Hoffman to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.
com/archives/2008/12/yaleloses_six.html (Dec. 16, 2008, 17:28 EST).
1796 [Vol. 77
UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENTS
endowment value, leaving a remaining value of $1.2 billion) had more than
.$110 million invested with Bernard Madoff.6
These precipitous declines have taken the spotlight off endowment
spending policies, at least temporarily. But because so many observers are
deeply troubled by the state of education in the United States, one can be
certain that the attention will return when the economy recovers. Tuition
has outpaced inflation for more than thirty years; if the prices of milk and
gasoline had risen at a similar rate, today a gallon of milk would cost $15,
and a gallon of gas would cost $9.15. 7 In 2007, private universities charged
an average of $32,000 each year in tuition and other fees, with some
schools charging almost $50,000.8 Even as tuition has risen across all of
higher education, a pronounced disparity in institutional wealth has
emerged. This wealth gap affects everything from the quality of classroom
instruction to the infrastructure, and divides college students into the haves
and have-nots. The discordance between massive endowments and the
general state of higher education has caught the attention of the Senate
Finance Committee, which held hearings on the matter in 2006 and 2007.
The Committee has been interested in endowment spending policies
because colleges and universities receive enormous subsidies from the
federal government. Some of these subsidies are based on a school's
organizational form under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 9
These include the tax-free status of income earned from activities related to
a university's educational function, 10 the tax-free status of investment
income, l1 the right to issue tax-exempt bonds to finance activities related to
the educational function, 12 and the ability of donors to deduct gifts to
universities made during life or at death. 13 The cumulative value of these
tax subsidies is beyond substantial. In 2007, for example, the exemption
from a tax on endowment investment returns cost the U.S. Treasury as
much as $18 billion.14 In 2008, the deductibility of gifts to educational
institutions cost over $4.26 billion in forgone income taxes alone. 15
6. Posting of Lawrence Cunningham to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurring
opinions.com/archives/2008/12/post_36.html (Dec. 17, 2008, 07:47 EST).
7. Jane Norman, Grassley to Colleges: Use Riches for Tuition, DES MOINES REG., Jan.
21, 2008, at A11 (quoting Senator Charles Grassley, the ranking Republican on the Senate
Finance Committee). Senator Charles Grassley was drawing on testimony that had been
made before the Senate Finance Committee during the previous year. See, e.g., Offshore Tax
Issues: Reinsurance and Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th
Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Munson] (statement of Lynne Munson, Adjunct Fellow, Center for
College Affordability and Productivity).
8. COLL. BD., TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRIcING 2 (2007), available at http://www.college
board.com/proddownloads/about/newsinfo/trends/trends.pricing-07.pdf.
9. Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66
TENN. L. Rv. 687, 697 (1999) (outlining categories of charitable subsidies).
10. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
11. Id.
12. Id. § 103. For the requirements for qualified 503(c)(3) bonds, see id. § 145.
13. Id. § 170(c)(2)(B) (discussing income tax); id. § 2055(a)(2) (discussing estate tax).
14. Memorandum from Jane G. Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Econ. Policy, Gov't &
Fin. Div., to Max Baucus, Chairman, Senate Fin Comm., and Charles Grassley, Ranking
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A host of other tax subsidies benefit colleges and universities by helping
create demand for their services. 16  Among these are the Helping
Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) tax credit (projected to cost the
Treasury $3 billion in 2008), 17 the Lifetime Learning tax credit ($2
billion),' 8 the tax treatment of education individual retirement accounts
($140 million), 19 state prepaid tuition plans ($710 million),20 employer-
provided educational assistance ($660 million), 21 the deductibility of
student loan interest ($820 million), 22 and the tax-free discharge of student
loan indebtedness ($20 million).2 3 All of these tax expenditures may lead a
student to conclude that she can afford to attend college or that she can
afford to enroll at a more expensive institution than she otherwise could.
Some scholars have even suggested that universities directly capture the
benefit of these demand-generating tax expenditures by raising their tuition
to account for the subsidy available to the prospective student.24
The Senate Finance Committee has not been alone in questioning
whether the public is receiving adequate benefit in exchange for the
favorable tax treatment granted to universities and colleges. Articles about
large endowments and related issues have become commonplace in industry
publications like the Chronicle of Higher Education and in the popular
press. Between January and March 2008, for instance, the New York Times
published almost fifteen pieces that discussed endowments, college tuition,
Member, Senate Fin Comm. (Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Gravelle Memorandum], available
at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg01 1408b.pdf.
15. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., 2007 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET
288 [hereinafter 2007 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET].
16. Brody, supra note 9, at 695.
17. 2007 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, supra note 15, at 288 tbl.19-1. Helping
Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) allows certain taxpayers a 100% credit for the
first $1000 of tuition and fees and a 50% credit for the next $1000 in tuition and fees. HOPE
only covers tuition and fees paid during the first two years of a student's postsecondary
education. Id. at 311.
18. Id. at 288. The Lifetime Learning Credit allows certain taxpayers a credit for 20%
of a student's tuition and fees, up to a maximum per return of $2000. The credit applies to
both undergraduate and graduate education. Id. at 311.
19. Id. at 288. Investment income earned by education individual retirement accounts
(IRAs) is not taxed when earned. The income is also tax-exempt when withdrawn to pay for
a student's tuition and fees. Id. at 311-12.
20. Id. at 288. Investment income earned by prepaid state tuition plans is not taxed
when earned and is tax-exempt when withdrawn to pay for qualified expenses. Id. at 312.
21. Id. at 288. Employer-provided educational assistance is excluded from gross income
even though the employer's costs are a deductible business expense. Id. at 312.
22. Id. at 288. During the first five years in which interest payments are required,
taxpayers are entitled to a $2500 above-the-line deduction on interest paid for an educational
loan. Id. at 312.
23. Id. at 288. Certain professionals who work in underserved areas and thus receive a
discharge from their student loans may not have to recognize the discharge as income. Id. at
312.
24. Brody, supra note 9, at 710; see Report Card on Tax Exemptions and Incentives for
Higher Education: Pass, Fail, or Need Improvement?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 109th Cong. 97 (2006) (statement of James J. Duderstadt, President Emeritus,
University of Michigan).
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or the growing wealth gap between institutions of higher education. All this
attention created tremendous pressure for universities-particularly wealthy
universities-to increase endowment spending. Until the current financial
crisis hit, schools responded by defending their spending policies or by
taking modest measures designed to defuse criticism.
Despite the lofty rhetoric and inflamed passions, the public debate over
university endowments has lacked detailed analysis of three key issues.
First, there has been inadequate discussion of how to best measure the
relative value of an institution's endowment. Second, critics have not
carefully explained the effects of excessively large endowments, both on
the institutions that hold them and on higher education in general. Instead,
the usual argument is that because some universities have large reserves,
they should spend more. The debate has also lacked thorough evaluation of
the arguments that universities raise in defense of their endowment policies.
Third and finally, while critics have floated multiple proposals for
congressional action, there has been no careful evaluation of the rationale
for and effects of these proposals.
This Essay tackles these issues. Part I considers absolute endowment
values, the amount of endowment per student, and expense-endowment
ratios at sixty private universities. This analysis suggests that a small
number of schools have "mega-endowments," or endowments that exceed
what is necessary to satisfy the usual purposes of an endowment. Part II
explains the effect that mega-endowments have at their home institutions
and throughout higher education. Part III critiques the university defense of
endowments and offers alternative explanations for why institutions
accumulate excessive endowments, ones that are rooted in cognitive
psychology instead of economic theory. Part IV critiques the various
proposals for congressional action. Part IV also suggests additional means
of encouraging endowment spending, with a particular focus on how donors
are able to influence endowment policy.
I. MEASURING THE SIZE OF ENDOWMENTS
The vast majority of universities have modest endowments at best. In
2007, 785 schools responded to the annual endowment survey conducted by
the National Association of College and University Business Officers
(NACUBO). While 76 had endowments of more than one billion dollars,
709 did not.25 The average endowment for all participating schools was
almost $524 million; the median endowment was just over $91 million.26
With such a wide range of endowment values, one threshold question is:
which institutions are truly wealthy? The answer to this question informs
judgments about whether Congress should take action to spur spending and,
if so, what sort of action is appropriate.
25. See 2007 ENDOWMENT STUDY, supra note 1, at 54-80.
26. Id. at 79.
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Like Goldilocks, policymakers have three choices for evaluating
endowments: absolute size, the expense-endowment ratio, and the amount
of endowment per full-time student. The first measure-absolute size-is
what has dominated in congressional discussions and media accounts.
Commentators repeatedly emphasize that some institutions have
endowments worth more than $1 billion.27 Senator Charles Grassley, the
ranking Republican on the Senate Finance Committee, has suggested that
endowments with absolute values that exceed $1 billion warrant particular
attention from Congress.28 For university critics, the $1 billion figure
undoubtedly has appeal in part because it sounds so large and therefore is
useful in helping to shock the public conscience. But the absolute size of an
endowment is a crude measure of its strength. The primary value of an
endowment stems from its ability to subsidize university operations.
Because the magnitude of activity is smaller at a liberal arts college, it
needs fewer resources than a large research university. In relative terms, $1
billion buys more at a small institution than at a large one.
Unlike a measure of absolute size, the endowment-to-expense ratio
acknowledges that the strength of an endowment depends on the extent to
which it can pay for institutional activities. Because the ratio compares the
endowment to an institution's actual costs, it is the most sophisticated
measure available to policymakers. Some economic research has defined
any ratio of more than 2:1 as evidence of an excessive endowment; 29 such
research has included, but not been limited to, educational institutions. One
commentator considering only universities has suggested that, depending on
institutional circumstances, an endowment exceeds its ideal size once it
surpasses a ratio of 5:1.3o
Impressions of institutional wealth change when endowments are
compared to institutional costs. The Appendix contains five tables. The
first four tables use 2007 data; the fifth table uses 2006 data.31 Table 1 lists,
27. See, e.g., Offshore Tax Issues: Reinsurance and Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Jane G. Gravelle, Senior Specialist
in Economic Policy, Congressional Research Service).
28. Karen W. Arenson, Yale Plans Sharp Increase in Student Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2008, at A14.
29. See John E. Core et al., Agency Problems of Excess Endowment Holdings in Not-for-
Profit Firms (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper, 2005); see also Raymond
Fisman & R. Glenn Hubbard, The Role of Nonprofit Endowments, in THE GOVERNANCE OF
NOT-FOR-PROFITS ORGANIZATIONS 217, 229 (Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2003) (noting that
among arts and educational organizations, the top 10% of organizations have a ratio of more
than 10:1).
30. Mark B. Schneider, Endowments Can Become Too Much of a Good Thing, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., June 2, 2006, at B 18.
31. At the time of this writing, expense information was not yet available for 2008,
hence the use of 2006 and 2007 data. For 2006, the endowment information is taken from
the 2006 NACUBO Endowment Study. NAT'L ASS'N OF COLL. & UNIV. Bus. OFFICERS, 2006
NACUBO ENDOWMENT STUDY 61-90 (2007) [hereinafter 2006 ENDOWMENT STUDY] (on file
with author), available at http://www.nacubo.org (for a fee). The expense data comes from
Line 17 of an institution's 2006-07 Form 990, as reported in the Chronicle of Higher
Education. Compensation of Presidents of Private Institutions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov.
1800 [Vol. 77
UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENTS
by rank, the private universities with the sixty highest absolute endowment
amounts. 32 Harvard is in first place with $34.6 billion; Grinnell is in
twenty-seventh place with $1.7 billion. Table 2 ranks the same private
universities by their endowment-expense ratios. Grinnell leaps to first place
(with a ratio of 16.5:1), while Harvard falls to number seven (with a ratio of
10.8:1). More importantly, some colleges (for example, Bowdoin and
Lafayette) have absolute endowments that are less than $1 billion ($827
million and $734 million, respectively), but endowment-expense ratios that
exceed 5:1. On the flip side, some institutions (for example, the University
of Pennsylvania and Vanderbilt) have absolute endowments well over $1
billion ($6.6 billon and $3.5 billion, respectively), but endowment-expense
ratios below 2:1. The absolute value of an endowment both under- and
overrepresents institutional wealth, sometimes dramatically.
The foregoing discussion suggests that endowment-expense ratios are the
best available tool for measuring the relative size of endowments.
Unfortunately, key disadvantages make the ratio an impractical choice for
policymakers who wish to monitor or regulate endowment spending. First,
an institution adjusts its operating budget in response to changes in its
endowment. Such adjustments can significantly change the ratio from year
to year,33 making it a moving target. Second, few universities are likely to
welcome scrutiny of their endowment spending policies, much less the
congressional regulation that might accompany such scrutiny. As such,
institutions are likely to be eager to lower their ratios. One way to
accomplish this would be to spend more-exactly the behavior Congress
might seek to encourage. But one can also imagine a series of Enron-like
maneuvers designed to manipulate the ratio.
This leaves the measure of endowment per full-time student. Like the
endowment-expense ratio, this measure acknowledges that some schools
are more expensive to run than others. But rather than use actual costs, the
measure relies on the number of full-time students as a rough proxy for
institutional expenses. Table 3 (which ranks institutions by endowment per
full-time student) shows that, while the measure is not as sensitive as the
endowment-expense ratio, it nonetheless provides a sense of relative
wealth. In Table 3, for instance, Grinnell (which has the highest
endowment-expense ratio) is ranked number seven, as compared to twenty-
seven when ranked by absolute wealth. Moreover, while the amount of
endowment per full-time student is less precise than the endowment-
16, 2007, at B21. For 2007, the endowment information is taken from the 2007 Endowment
Study, supra note 1, at 55-80, 141-55. The 2007 expense data again comes from the
Chronicle of Higher Education. Compensation of Presidents of Private Institutions, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 21, 2008, at B 15.
32. In these tables, the "endowment" consists of "the total of all [funds] held for the
institution's long-term benefit." See 2007 ENDOWMENT STUDY, supra note 1, at 1099
(defining "endowment"). It does not include operating funds, plant fund assets, pension
funds, working capital, or pledges. See id.
33. Schneider, supra note 30.
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expense ratio, it is also more difficult to manipulate and less likely to vary
significantly from year to year.
There has been almost no discussion of what amount of endowment per
full-time student is indicative of an excessive endowment. 34 Tables 4 and
5, which list expense-endowment ratios and the amount of endowment per
full-time student, provide some insight. Recall that economic researchers
have suggested that an expense-endowment ratio of more than 2:1 is
excessive; others have suggested that ratios should not exceed 5:1. 35 A
review of the data from 2007 (as reflected in Table 4) and 2006 (as reflected
in Table 5) shows that schools with endowments per full-time student in the
range of $300,000-$350,000 or more tend to have expense-endowment
ratios that are at least 5:1. Thus an endowment per full-time student in the
$300,000-$350,0000 range suggests that a university could spend more
without jeopardizing its long-term prospects. These are the universities
with endowments that are aptly described as "mega," that is, whose values
exceed what is necessary to satisfy the usual purposes of an endowment.
This benchmark is by no means perfect. Table 4 shows that, in 2007, the
low end of the range ($300,000) would have picked up the University of
Pennsylvania and Vanderbilt, both of which have endowment-expense
ratios of less than 2:1. The high end of the range ($350,000) would have
missed some institutions with ratios of 5:1 or higher. (Lafayette, for
example, had an endowment per full-time student of approximately
$316,000.) The amount of endowment per full-time student might also
overstate the relative wealth of an institution. As Table 5 shows, in 2006, a
premier research institution, the California Institute of Technology, had an
endowment per full-time student of more than $700,000, but an
endowment-expense ratio of less than 1: 1. This anomaly likely results from
Cal Tech's small student body and its enormous research budget.
The point, however, is not that the amount of endowment per full-time
student is the perfect proxy for institutional wealth. Rather, the argument is
that it is less easily manipulated than the endowment-expense ratio and
more revealing than the absolute amount of an endowment. As Congress
considers which institutions genuinely have an excessive endowment, the
amount of endowment per full-time student will be its most useful measure.
With this measure explained, Parts II and III discuss the concerns that
have been raised about the effects of mega-endowments and the way
universities and colleges have responded to these concerns. The discussion
is colored by an issue about whether Congress or universities and colleges
bear the burden of proof. That is, do universities and colleges have to
convince the public about the wisdom of their endowment spending
policies, or does Congress have to convince the public that the social good
34. One commentator suggests that an endowment of $500,000 per student is an
appropriate trigger, but no evidence suggests that the relative merits of this number were
carefully considered. See Herbert A. Allen, Op-Ed., Gold in the Ivory Tower, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2007, at A39 (discussing the advantages of taxing endowment investment income).
35. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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produced by these policies is inadequate in light of the favorable tax
treatment that these institutions receive? Because current tax policy so
favors universities and colleges, 36 the following discussion reflects the
belief that universities bear the responsibility for demonstrating the wisdom
of their spending polices and the relative good created by them.
II. THE CONCERNS ABOUT MEGA-ENDOWMENTS
As suggested, the sheer magnitude of $1 billion probably would have led
to questions about whether the wealthiest universities still need the tax
subsidies noted in the Introduction, as well as whether the public receives
adequate benefit in exchange for those subsidies. But other factors are also
fueling concerns about mega-endowments, including rising tuition, the
promise of research and development that takes place in university
laboratories, and the inefficiencies that mega-endowments may create at the
institutions that hold them. This part discusses these concerns.
First and foremost, it is the combination of endowment values and the
ever-rising costs of tuition that have made endowment spending policies the
focus of congressional attention.37 Average tuition increases have been
outpacing inflation for at least thirty years. 38 In academic year 2006-2007,
the average published tuition and fees at four-year private colleges and
universities were up 6.3% (for an average total charge of $32,307). At four-
year public colleges and universities, costs were up by 6.6% for in-state
students (for an average total charge of $13,589) and 5.5% for out-of-state
students (for an average total charge of $24,044). 39 Net tuition-that is,
what students actually pay after grant aid and tax benefits-has grown at
about the same rates.40 As a general matter, mega-endowment universities
and colleges tend to increase tuition at rates consistent with other
institutions, although there are exceptions. 41  Critics of endowment
spending policies want universities to use more of their endowments to help
offset the cost of an education. 42 One study of twenty universities and ten
liberal arts colleges suggests that small increases in endowment distribution
could "mitigate or eliminate tuition growth and substantially expand student
aid."43
There is also concern that mega-endowments increase tuition at less
prosperous schools. This is because the spending at mega-endowment
36. See supra notes 10-24.
37. Members of the Senate Finance Committee began to express interest when Grinnell
announced a 12.6% tuition increase for the 2007-2008 academic year. Norman, supra note
7.
38. COLL. BD., supra note 8, at 2 (College Board has only been collecting data for about
30 years).
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. at 2.
41. See infra notes 91, 98 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Munson, supra note 7.
43. Gravelle Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2.
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universities affects the priorities of less wealthy institutions. Rich colleges
are able to spend ample funds on classroom instruction and still build
campus amenities "like fitness centers and wireless-Internet hot spots." 44
These amenities raise student expectations and may be particularly
important to eighteen-year-olds who are deciding where to go to college.
Less wealthy institutions are thus pressured to add similar amenities by
diverting funds from other purposes, including those more directly related
to education.45 As a general matter, the gap in instructional spending
between rich and poor institutions continues to grow. In the past ten years,
average instructional spending at institutions in the top quartile of wealth
has grown by 37%, while instructional spending by those schools in the
bottom quartile has grown by only 6%.46 At the same time, the amount of
debt carried by poorer institutions continues to increase. 47
Public criticism of endowment spending policies has focused almost
entirely on how particular endowment spending policies might affect
tuition. Some elite institutions, however, have missions that emphasize
research as much (or even more) than they emphasize education. At these
universities, endowment spending policies have an even broader effect and
there are strong arguments for more spending. At the risk of sounding
Pollyannaish, the sort of research taking place at America's premier
universities is designed to lead to much social good: the easing of the
global food crunch, the elimination of certain diseases, and so forth, as well
as the creation of knowledge more generally. The ability of researchers and
scholars to make productive use of endowment funds seems almost endless,
as do the potential gains from their work. But as Part III discusses,
universities often argue that their endowment spending policies reflect
"intergenerational equity," that is, institutions have to spend less in the
present to ensure that they will be able to provide a comparable quality of
education to future generations. 48 Ordinarily, however, one would not
argue that society will be better off if a particular research advance happens
later rather than sooner. The advantages of research developments
occurring as soon as possible provide a strong argument for universities to
engage in more present endowment spending than they currently do.
Beyond concerns about tuition and delaying research and development,
mega-endowments may have disadvantages for the institutions that hold
them. A large-scale study of nonprofits has suggested that organizations
with excess endowments are inefficient, such that the percentage of
program expenditures for the charitable good tends to be lower than at other
organizations, while expenditures for fundraising and other administrative
44. Jeffrey Selingo & Jeffrey Brainard, The Rich-Poor Gap Widens for Colleges and
Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 7, 2006, at Al.
45. Id. (quoting William G. Bowen, former president of Princeton University and
president of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See infra Part III.A.
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expenses tend to be higher.49  Excess endowments also increase the
spending discretion of the nonprofit's managers.5 0 One commentator has
worried that this will lead to "mission drift" because more key decisions
will be made by a powerful few instead of being painstakingly hammered
out by faculty, as is the tradition at most universities with long histories. 51
Critics of universities would argue that all of these concerns-inefficiency,
a present need for increased research and development, and, especially,
rising tuition-warrant a change in the tax treatment of the nation's most
prosperous universities.
III. IN DEFENSE (AND REBUTTAL) OF MEGA-ENDOWMENTS
Universities have responded to this heightened scrutiny by emphasizing
four factors: (1) the importance of intergenerational equity; (2) the need for
predictable and stable sources of funding; (3) the donor restrictions attached
to the many individual funds that, together, comprise the endowment; and
(4) the good use to which endowment funds are already put, particularly
with respect to student financial aid. As an initial matter, this last argument
is almost beside the point. The issue is not whether endowment spending
furthers the public good. The question is whether, in the aggregate,
increased endowment spending would do even more good. The other three
arguments most often advanced in defense of mega-endowments, however,
deserve more extended discussion.
A. Intergenerational Equity
When an institution strives for intergenerational equity, it embraces the
principle that an endowment should provide the same level of support to
both current and future students. As a formal matter, endowment managers
assume that the university will endure forever and adopt a spending rate
that ensures the endowment can support the same activities in 2058 as it
does in 2008. This means that endowment managers have to reinvest a
portion of investment earnings, so that the endowment can support the same
activities even after their costs have risen over time. Under this approach,
the endowment can support additional activities only after it is enlarged by
additional capital gifts. 52  More liberal spending policies would
compromise the interests of future students for the benefit of current
students, in direct contradiction to the principle of intergenerational equity.
Most Americans would subscribe to at least limited-term
intergenerational equity; that is, we care about the interests of our children
49. Core et al., supra note 29, at 23.
50. Id. at 7.
51. Schneider, supra note 30.
52. James Tobin, What Is Permanent Endowment Income?, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 427, 427
(1974).
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and grandchildren as much as we care about our own. 53 The problem is that
intergenerational equity "provide[s] very doubtful support for current
endowment policies." 54 First, the economy is likely to grow in the future
just as it has in the past. To wit, the 2007 Social Security Trustees' Report
projects gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates over a seventy-five-
year horizon, using three different sets of assumptions, all with varying
degrees of pessimism and optimism about what is likely to unfold. A
researcher who has used the Trustees' Report to make projections about
future material standards of living describes the results as "stunning": "per
capita GDP is forecast to rise by 124% by 2080 in the [most pessimistic
scenario], by 212% in the intermediate scenario, and by 333% in the [most
optimistic] scenario. . . . [E]ven the most pessimistic scenario show[s]
income per capita more than doubling in just over seven decades." 55 Thus
future students (and their families) are likely to be at least as prosperous as
today's. This prosperity will also allow the alumni of tomorrow to
contribute to endowments just like the alumni of today. Because future
gifts are likely, universities should take them into account as they plan for
the financial horizon.56
In his work on endowments, Professor Henry Hansmann has noted that
saving for the future assumes that a university's expenditures will yield the
same or increased productivity over time. 57  But demand for the
institution's services might instead decrease with time because of increased
competition, changes in educational technology, or for a host of other
reasons. Such risks justify applying a positive discount rate to future
expenditures. 58 Moreover, because demand for education is elastic-that
is, demand varies with quality, quantity, or both-efficiency considerations
argue against reinvesting investment earnings as the costs of education are
rising. If education will be more costly in the future than today, we should
not do without now to consume later; that is the equivalent of substituting a
more expensive good for a cheaper one. 59 Finally and most fundamentally,
53. For a review of the literature on intergenerational equity, see Neil H. Buchanan,
What Do We Owe Future Generations?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009)
(manuscript pt. II, on file with the Fordham Law Review). For a multifaceted discussion of
the issues concerning intergenerational justice, see Symposium, Intergenerational Equity, 35
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 163 (2001).
54. Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 14
(1990).
55. Buchanan, supra note 53, at 46. Neil Buchanan acknowledges that economic
forecasts are "often proved wrong," but "the scale of revisions necessary to result in a
forecast of zero net growth (or something even close to that level) over a several-decade
span appear[s] to be beyond reason. Short of unpredictable cataclysms (weather-related
disasters, world war, the collapse of global capitalism), [the Social Security Trustees'
forecasts] are among the most solid available." Id. at 46-47.
56. Hansmann, supra note 54, at 16.
57. Id.
58. Id. The question of what constitutes the appropriate discount rate often dominates
discussions of intergenerational equity. See Symposium, Intergenerational Equity and
Discounting, 74 U CHIi. L. REV. 1 (2007).
59. Hansmann, supra note 54, at 17-18.
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it is not at all clear that endowment savings is the best way for a university
to benefit future generations. As Hansmann puts it,
[W]hen a university adds a dollar to its endowment for the purpose of
making an intergenerational transfer, it is implicitly making the judgment
that the dollar will have a higher rate of return if invested in stocks and
bonds than in educating an undergraduate, or doing research in
biophysics, or adding books to the library. 60
Hansmann's debunking of intergenerational equity as a basis for
endowment spending policies was published nearly twenty years ago in an
essay that ended with the counsel that universities consider whether "their
policies toward endowment accumulation are reasonable in light of the ends
to which their institutions are dedicated. '61  Since then, his critique of
intergenerational equity and endowment policies has been repeated in
articles that have appeared in the Chronicle of Higher Education, a staple
publication for university administrators.62 To my knowledge, not a single
university has attempted to explain why its endowment policies are a sound
means of furthering intergenerational equity. Instead, they announce
intergenerational equity as a goal and then state the spending rule they have
adopted in light of it;63 endowments must spend less in the present so that
the amount earned by the endowment keeps pace with inflation. This is
different than explaining why the goal actually justifies the spending rule.
On the current state of the economic evidence, endowment spending
policies do not support intergenerational equity. As such, intergenerational
equity is not a reason for allowing universities to continue endowment
management as usual.
B. Saving for a Rainy Day
Another common justification for large endowments is that they serve as
a predictable and stable source of funding-a hedge against a rainy day.64
Right now rain is falling on universities because of the downturn in
financial markets, but other possible difficulties include a decrease in the
number of qualified students who can afford tuition, a drop in alumni
giving, a downturn in financial markets, cutbacks in government aid, or a
60. Id. at 18.
61. Id. at 40.
62. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, Bigger Is Not Necessarily Better, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., May 28, 2004, at B26; Henry Riggs, Boards Should Reconsider What They Mean by
Intergenerational Equity, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 5, 2005, at B21; Schneider, supra
note 30.
63. See, e.g., Dana G. Mead & Jeremy M. Jacobs, Don't Require Colleges to Spend
More of Their Endowments, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 9, 2007, at B20; Should Colleges
Be Required to Spend More of Their Endowments?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 14, 2008,
at A33 (quoting remarks of Charles Miller, former Chairman of Texas Board of Regents and
Chairman of the U.S. Department of Education's Commission on the Future of Higher
Education).
64. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 54, at 21; Mead & Jacobs, supra note 63.
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sharp increase in costs. Any prudent university would elect to guard against
these risks.
But Table 2 in the Appendix suggests that mega-endowment institutions
have built far too large an ark. More than half of the institutions in Table 2
had an endowment in 2007 that could cover their operating budgets for
more than three years; those in the upper quartile had more than a six-year
reserve; and those in the top ten percent had more than a ten-year reserve.65
Moreover, an endowment does not include the value of a university's
physical assets, which can be used as security on a loan to help carry an
institution through financial difficulties. 66
This is not to suggest that institutions are being disingenuous when they
make rainy day arguments. Universities are mostly the equivalent of their
human parts. Surveys have shown that when it comes to an individual's
financial well-being, perceived security is highly subjective. For example,
in a survey of 112 individuals with net worth of over $5 million,
respondents were asked to rank themselves on a scale of zero to ten, with a
10 indicating that they felt completely financially secure. 67 Thirty-six
percent of respondents rated themselves as a ten. Respondents who rated
themselves as an eight or nine indicated that they would require an average
of an additional 60% of their net worth to feel completely financially
secure; respondents who rated themselves lower than 8 indicated that they
would require an average increase of 285%.68 While respondents were
presumably accustomed to the standard of living their wealth provided (just
as universities are with their endowments), their subjective view likely bore
little resemblance to their economic reality. A similar dynamic may be in
play here, with the human leaders of universities reacting to institutional
wealth in much the same way they would react to individual wealth.
C. Donor-Restricted Funds
Universities also defend endowment spending policies by pointing to
donor restrictions. An endowment consists of many different gifts. The
donors of at least some of these gifts have provided legally binding
instructions about how universities can use the money. Even if an
institution wanted to, say, provide free tuition for every student, it could not
tap all of its endowment to do so; some of the funds would be restricted for
professorships, building projects, and other uses that are far removed from
free tuition. A study by NACUBO estimates that, in 2006, an average of
65. As discussed in the next section, some endowment funds are restricted to particular
uses. A university is thereby limited in its ability to put these funds to general use, at least in
the absence of a release granted by the donor or a court. See infra notes 69-75 and
accompanying text.
66. Hansmann, supra note 54, at 22.
67. Paul G. Schervish & John J. Havens, Gifts and Bequests: Family or Philanthropic
Organizations?, in DEATH AND DOLLARS: THE ROLE OF GIFTs AND BEQUESTS IN AMERICA
130, 143-45 (Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sund6n eds., 2003).
68. Id. at 143-44.
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80% of endowment funds were restricted at public universities, and an
average of 55% at private universities. 69
Donor restrictions undoubtedly limit a university's discretion, but there is
reason to suspect (1) that some universities overstate the magnitude of
restrictions; and (2) that the restrictions are partially of the university's own
making. As an initial matter, and as the NACUBO study cited above
suggests, what is loosely referred to as "the endowment" does not consist
entirely of restricted funds. An endowment also is comprised of
unrestricted gifts (or portions of unrestricted gifts), which the university has
elected to save rather than spend.70 A study of annual giving at private
research universities suggests that richer institutions, as measured by
endowment-per-student and as compared to poorer institutions, tend to
direct a larger share of their unrestricted annual gifts toward building the
endowment and a smaller share toward current operations. 71 This sort of
policy is one of the reasons for the ever-widening gap between rich and
poor institutions, 72 and also is likely to yield an endowment with ample
unrestricted funds. Indeed, the NACUBO study suggests that 45 0/--nearly
half-of the endowment funds at private institutions are unrestricted.73
Universities and colleges also exert considerable influence over whether
gifts are restricted or unrestricted, and, if restricted, the precise terms of the
restriction. For example, institutions expend significant resources
cultivating donors and helping to shape their giving preferences. These
cultivated gifts often pay for expenditures the university would have made
even without a gift, thereby allowing the institution to redirect funds to
current expenses or to the endowment. 74  Furthermore, corporations,
foundations, and alumni each tend to favor different sorts of projects, with
corporations and foundations more likely to give to current operating
expenses. 75 Thus the allocation of development staff can help determine
the kinds of gifts that an institution receives. In sum, while donor
restrictions limit the use of some endowment funds, such restrictions do not
necessarily mean that universities cannot spend more. Even more
important, as universities and Congress plan for the future, they should
recognize that institutions themselves exert considerable control over the
composition of their endowments.
69. 2006 ENDOWMENT STUDY, supra note 31, at 78.
70. 2007 ENDOWMENT STUDY, supra note 1, at 1100 (defining "endowment").
71. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Christopher L. Smith, The Sources and Uses of Annual
Giving at Private Research Universities 17 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7307, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8307.
72. Id. at 20.
73. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
74. Ehrenberg & Smith, supra note 71, at 5.
75. Id. at 6 n.4.
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D. Beyond the Proffered Justifications
As the previous discussion suggests, upon close examination, the
common justifications for mega-endowments are unpersuasive. Yet
universities are passionate about the correctness of their endowment
spending policies. 76  Because mega-endowment institutions are at the
epicenter of American intellectual life, it is puzzling to find universities
offering defenses that do not withstand academic scrutiny. Perhaps
"building the endowment" has been a goal for so long that university
leaders have not paused to consider whether it is still rational in light of
billion dollar endowments. 77 What is equally likely, however, is that
endowment spending policies are rational, but not for reasons that warrant
deference or support from Congress or American taxpayers.
Measuring the overall quality of a university is a difficult task, as the
endless criticism of the U.S. News & World Report rankings illustrates. 78
The factors that are typically relevant when evaluating a college-the
classroom experience, faculty, campus life, and postgraduation
opportunities-have values that are at best subjective. In contrast, the value
of an endowment is a concrete measure of a university's success. Among
other things, the amount of the endowment: (1) reflects the enthusiasm that
alumni and other donors have for the university, (2) provides evidence of
institutional permanence, and (3) suggests a means for meeting goals and
surmounting short- and long-term challenges. The amount of the
endowment (and often its yearly increase or decrease) is reported to ranking
entities such as U.S. News, to alumni, to professional associations like
NACUBO, and in industry publications like the Chronicle of Higher
Education. In short, the amount of the endowment is the most concrete and
visible sign of a university's success. Institutions that do well by this
measure are understandably loathe to adopt policies that might compromise
the absolute value of their endowments.
The concreteness of the endowment is also important for boards of
trustees and the presidents whom they hire. Professor Hansmann has noted
that trustees "generally come from the business world rather than the
academic world," and that, therefore, overseeing financial investments is
often closer to their areas of expertise than guiding the operations of an
educational institution. 79 Just as outside observers use the endowment as a
proxy for institutional success, boards of trustees are inclined to use the size
76. See, e.g., Princeton Univ., University Submits Statement on Endowments to Senate
Committee (Oct. 9, 2007), available at http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/
S19/19/37067/index.xml (reproducing statements by Robert K. Durkee, Vice President and
Secretary of Princeton University, defending Princeton's approach to its endowment).
77. Hansmann, supra note 54, at 29-30 (noting that Harvard and Yale began building
endowments around 1825).
78. For extended criticism of the rankings, see Symposium, The Next Generation of Law
School Rankings, 81 IND. L. J. 1 (2006).
79. Hansmann, supra note 54, at 37.
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of the endowment as a measure of their success in managing the
university.8 0
The size of the endowment is important for university presidents as well.
In recent years, more presidents have come from corporations, 8' making
their expertise more similar to that of trustees. But even those without a
corporate background are increasingly viewed as the nonprofit equivalents
of chief executive officers, with compensation packages that reflect this
corporate mindset. In 2006, 81 presidents of private institutions made more
than $500,000, a 200% increase from five years earlier; 82 12 presidents
made more than $1 million, almost twice the number as in 2005.83 At
public research universities, the "minimum compensation among big
players is $450,000."84 Ten public institutions pay their presidents at least
$700,000, up from just two in 2005. While these salaries still pale in
comparison to what can be eamed in the private sector, they were
nonetheless "inconceivable" just twenty years ago. 85 Boards of trustees
justify these salaries by pointing to "intense competition to hold onto
talented executives necessary to help build institutional wealth and
prestige." 86  Predictably, institutional wealth is measured by the rate of
endowment growth. The endowment thus has become the primary
yardstick by which boards of trustees judge not just themselves, but also
their top administrators. 87 In a large study of almost 9000 nonprofits,
including more than 2000 educational institutions,88 researchers found a
positive correlation between executive compensation and an excess
endowment, with the amount of compensation increasing as the amount of
excess endowment increased. 89
Of course, whether an institution has a "successful" endowment should
be judged on more than just the value of the endowment on the financial
markets. A better measure would reflect the size of the endowment, the
percentage of earnings and assets spent each year, and how the spending
reflects the institution's short- and long-term priorities. This sort of
individualized assessment, however, would involve the same sort of
subjectivity that is inherent in evaluating the overall quality of a university.
80. Id.
81. Presidential Pay Is Increasing Fastest at the Largest Institutions, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Nov. 16, 2007, at B3.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Jonathan D. Glater, Increased Compensation Puts More College Presidents in the
Million-Dollar Club, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2007, at A11.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing the chairman of the University of Delaware's board of trustees, who "in a
statement described the growth in his institution's endowment... during the tenure of David
P. Roselle, who retired this summer as the university's president and who was the [second-
highest] earner at a public institution").
88. John Core et al., supra note 29, at 11.
89. Id. at 27.
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In other words, to look beyond an endowment's absolute amount
compromises its value as a concrete indicator of success.
None of this is to suggest that boards of trustees or university
administrators are more concerned about the absolute size of the
endowment than about the well-being of the institution itself. But when so
much emphasis has been placed on the endowment, and for so long, at some
point the endowment begins to become the university. Thus congressional
or other outside criticism of endowment spending policies are perceived as
striking at the very heart of the institution. Moreover, when endowment
management is the leading performance measure for university leaders, a
retreat from existing spending policies may seem tantamount to a
confession of professional misjudgment. This provides all the more reason
for mega-endowment institutions to hunker down and defend spending (or
not spending) as usual. But when the university's proffered justifications
for its spending policies are unconvincing, and when other plausible
explanations do not warrant deference, Congress needs to rethink its tax
treatment of university endowments.
IV. CHANGING TAX TREATMENT OF MEGA-ENDOWMENT UNIVERSITIES
(AND THEIR DONORS)
When the Senate Finance Committee began rattling its saber in 2006,90
some mega-endowment schools announced measures to help defray tuition
costs. For example, Princeton did not raise tuition for the 2007-2008
academic year.91 In 2008, Yale raised tuition by 2.2%, the "lowest increase
in recent memory." 92  Most notably, several schools have recently
announced that lower-income students (those with, depending on the
institution, annual family incomes between $40,000 and $100,000) will
receive grants instead of loans. 93 In 2008, Harvard expanded its financial
aid program to include families with annual incomes up to $180,000 and
Yale quickly followed suit. 94 Yale announced that it would increase
endowment spending to at least 4.5% and at most 6%, up from about 3.8%
90. See generally Report Card on Tax Exemptions and Incentives for Higher Education:
Pass, Fail, or Need Improvement?: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 1
(2006).
91. Karen Arenson, Tuition Steady at Princeton, Other Fees Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2007, at B5.
92. Alexandra Perloff-Giles, Yale and Princeton Limit Tuition Hike, HARV. CRIMSON,
Feb. 5, 2008, available at http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=-521706 (quoting the
Yale Daily News).
93. Brown Ends Tuition for Lower-Income Students, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2008, at A 13
(noting similar policy changes by Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, and Stanford). Princeton has
followed such a policy for a decade. Jonathan Glater, Stanford Set to Raise Aid for Students
in Middle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, at A14.
94. See Roger Lehecka & Andrew Delbanco, Op-Ed., Ivy-League Letdown, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2008, at A21 (expressing concern that policy will work to the detriment of poor
students because institutions would rather give partial scholarships to middle-income
students than full scholarships to poor students).
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the previous year.95 Stanford similarly has stated that it would increase its
endowment spending to 5.5%.96 All of these measures were signs "that the
nation's wealthiest universities are trying to fend off action by members of
Congress who question why universities raise tuition faster than the rate of
inflation while the value of their endowments soar."97
None of this, however, means that universities should be allowed to
police themselves. First, universities have a long history of conservative
spending policies. A spate of congressional interest is probably not enough
to permanently change institutional predispositions. For example, in 2000
and 2001, Congress took a similar interest in endowments. Williams
College responded by freezing tuition rates for a year; but it has increased
tuition in subsequent years and today has tuition comparable to that of its
competitors.98 Second, it is difficult for institutional outsiders to appreciate
the broader context in which change occurs. When Princeton held tuition
steady in 2007, it also had an unusually high increase in other fees, which
resulted in a 4.2% overall increase for students with a full meal contract. 99
Third, given the magnitude of the tax benefits granted to universities (and
their donors), 100 Congress has a heightened responsibility to ensure that the
public is receiving adequate benefit.
To date, three potential congressional actions have emerged during the
course of the public debate: (1) making universities subject to the same
five-percent spending rule as private foundations; (2) revising Form 990,
which is filed annually with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by all
private universities and some organizations that are related to public
universities; and (3) taxing the investment income earned by mega-
endowments. As discussed below, revising Form 990 and taxing
investment income have merit; a five-percent spending rule is more
dubious. Congress should also consider an avenue that has not previously
been suggested: attempting to influence donor behavior.
A. Five-Percent Spending Rule
Universities are not required to report their rates of endowment spending,
but industry surveys provide a sense of common practices. In 2007, 792
colleges and universities reported spending rates to NACUBO (which codes
its results so that users cannot identify the spending rate of any particular
institution). Between 2000 and 2007, the average endowment spending rate
ranged from.4.6% to 5.1%.101 When the average was dollar-weighted-to
95. Alan Finder, Yale Plans to Increase Spending from Its Endowment with Financial
Aid to Benefit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at A12.
96. Glater, supra note 93.
97. Finder, supra note 95.
98. Scott Jaschik, Princeton Freezes Tuition, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Jan. 22, 2007,
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/01/22/princeton.
99. Arenson, supra note 91.
100. See supra notes 9-23 and accompanying text.
101. 2007 ENDOWMENT STUDY, supra note 1, at 17, 23
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account for the fact that institutions with larger endowments had
disproportionate effect on the average-the spending rates decreased, with
ranges from 4.0% to 5.0%. 102 For 2007, the equal-weighted average was
4.6%, while the dollar-weighted average was 4.2%.103 At a minimum, the
survey shows that many mega-endowment universities are annually
spending less than 5% of their endowments.
Unlike colleges and universities, private foundations are required to
make annual distributions for charitable purposes-at least 5% of the value
of the foundation's noncharitable assets and the minimum investment
return. 104 One proposal is that Congress make universities subject to a
similar requirement.l0 5 While this proposal would boost spending at some
institutions and makes for a convenient threat, the five-percent rule is an
inappropriate response to mega-endowments.
The five-percent rule and questions about whether universities are
hoarding their endowments have a superficial similarity, in that both aim to
ensure that the public receives benefits in exchange for the tax subsidies
given to charitable organizations. But the five-percent rule also reflects
policy concerns that are largely absent in the university context. There is
real risk that a private foundation will be organized primarily for the private
good; that is, for the benefit of its donors (who receive tax breaks for
funding the foundation and who may be able to capture benefits by serving
in an administrative capacity) and board members (who similarly may
benefit from their administrative roles). 106
This risk is compounded by a private foundation's lack of accountability.
Because private foundations typically are funded by a single individual or
family, they are far less accountable than colleges and universities, which
usually receive funding from government, corporations, foundations, and
private donors. This lack of accountability magnifies the risk that a private
foundation will serve the private, and not the public, good. Indeed, the five-
percent rule is just one of a series of measures aiming to ensure that private
foundations do not just advance private interests. Other measures include
prohibitions on self-dealing' 0 7 and limitations on the ability to acquire or
retain holdings in business enterprises. 08
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. I.R.C. § 4942 (2000).
105. Goldie Blumenstyk, College Groups Discourage Forced Endowment Payouts,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 19, 2007, at A19. A variation on this proposal is to set a payout
rate that would vary with the rate of investment return. Gravelle Memorandum, supra note
14.
106. See CHRISTINE AHN ET AL., CTR. FOR PUB. & NONPROFIT LEADERSHIP, GEORGETOWN
PUB. POLICY INST., FOUNDATION TRUSTEE FEES: USE AND ABUSE 16 (2003) (showing that, in
a study of 62 small foundations, over 25% spent more than 40% of their administrative fees
on trustee compensation).
107. I.R.C. § 4941(d)(1); see John M. Strefeler & Leslie T. Miller, Exempt
Organizations: A Study of Their Nature and the Applicability of the Unrelated Business
Income Tax, 12 AKRON TAX J. 223, 242 (1996) (elaborating on the ban on self-dealing).
108. I.R.C. § 4943(c)(2)(A).
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While we can question whether universities can make better use of their
endowments, no one would seriously argue that institutions like Harvard
and Grinnell primarily benefit private interests. The five-percent rule may
guarantee some basic level of charitableness but universities have already
achieved that. Given the magnitude of educational tax subsidies, and the
hurdle that tuition poses for most families, universities should strive for
more: to provide the greatest possible level of public benefit without
jeopardizing their long-term health.
Aside from the theoretical arguments, there is reason to question whether
mandatory spending would have the results its proponents anticipate.
Advocates of a mandatory spending rule assume that the increased
endowment spending would decrease tuition; that is, an endowment would
bear some of the costs that are currently borne by students. Contrary to this
assumption, however, a mandatory spending rule could have the
unintentional effect of raising tuition across the board.
Even in a world of mandatory spending, universities are likely to try to
maintain the size of their endowments. This means the endowment yield
must at least equal the annual institutional budget increase and the required
payout amount. Higher education budgets have been tending to increase at
a rate of roughly 6% each year,109 so the typical university might aim for a
yield of 11% (to cover the 5% annual payout and the budget increase). This
would likely push universities with conservative endowment management
policies toward strategies that offer the possibility of higher returns. These
same strategies are likely to have higher risk and greater yield variability.
One researcher has begun to study endowment patterns at universities
and colleges. His very preliminary results demonstrate what one might
intuitively expect: high-yield endowments are also more variable. For
example, New York University, Cornell, Grinnell and Massachusetts
Institute of Technology had endowment yields over 10 years of 8.8%,
10.3%, 12.4% and 15.1%, respectively.' 10 Grinnell and MIT had the two
highest one-year yields (38% and 55.6%), but also the two largest one-year
losses (-12.2% and -10%)."' NYU, which had the smallest return over the
ten-year period, did not have a single year of negative returns. 112 While
mega-endowment universities have endowments that are large enough to
withstand the years with negative returns, the variability inherent in a high-
risk strategy is problematic nonetheless.
Recall that one criticism of university spending is that some of it actually
increases the cost of higher education, because it fuels an arms race for the
best facilities and student amenities.1 13 That is, less wealthy institutions
believe that they have to make similar expenditures on their physical plants
109. See supra note 38.
110. Mark B. Schneider, Professor of Physics, Grinnell Coll., Comments for Endowment
Roundtable (Sept. 8, 2008) (on file with author)
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 44-45.
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and campuses in order to compete for students. The naming opportunities
that attract large donors are often seen as contributing to the arms race, and
the same may be true of the sort of "one-time" spending that a university is
likely to undertake after a high-yield year. Although proponents of
mandatory spending see it as a means of reducing tuition, a five-percent
rule may affect a university's spending priorities, sometimes in ways that
are contrary to the overarching goal of controlling tuition.
B. Form 990
The IRS requires private universities and colleges to annually file Form
990, which requests information about programs and finances. Form 990
has recently undergone revisions, 114 and some have suggested that it should
include questions designed to shed light on endowment practices. 1 5 Such
questions include: (1) What is the size of the endowment? (2) On what is
the endowment being spent? (3) Which endowment funds are restricted to
specific purposes and what are those purposes? (4) How are endowment
funds invested? (5) What are the costs of managing the endowment? 116
These sorts of revisions would be both sensible and useful.
Revisions to Form 990, of course, would not compel any particular
changes in endowment spending policies. Because a completed Form 990
is publicly available, however, the answers to these questions would add
transparency to a particular institution's policies, as well as illuminate
standard practices. A university, knowing its information was public, might
feel compelled to spend more. In any event, a revised Form 990 would be
useful to a Congress that periodically reevaluates its treatment of
universities. The rare donor who is diligent enough to seek out the Form
990 might find the revisions useful as well. Moreover, the answers to at
least some of the revised questions are likely to find their way into the
media and thereby color perceptions of particular institutions. For example,
Form 990 contains information about executive compensation. This salary
data is reported by industry publications and then regurgitated in the
popular press.
Universities may not like the increased scrutiny, but they have little
grounds on which to object. While a revised Form 990 may cost more to
complete, such expenditures are unlikely to be a significant factor in a
university budget. 117 In addition, many institutions already report similar
information to NACUBO (where it is compiled and reported in ways that
114. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Releases Discussion Draft of
Redesigned Form 990 for Tax-Exempt Organizations (June 14, 2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id= 171329,00.html.
115. Press Release, Office of Senator Charles Grassley, Sen. Grassley Works to Build
Confidence in Nonprofits with Greater Transparency (May 29, 2007), available at
http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel-dataPagelD_1502=12581.
116. Id.
117. Paul Fain, A Tax Expert Explains What's in Store for the IRS Form 990, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 16, 2007, at B14.
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often shield the identity of particular schools). For these schools, a revised
Form 990 is likely to pose little additional burden.
C. Taxing Investment Returns
Another idea is to make endowment investment returns subject to the
corporate income tax. This proposal has a couple of iterations. The most
straightforward would earmark the funds generated for congressional
measures designed to alleviate tuition costs. The more complex would
create a revenue-sharing scheme, with funds distributed directly to poorer
institutions on a pro rata basis, as determined by the size of an institution's
student-to-endowment ratio. 118 Between 1997 and 2007, endowments of at
least one billion dollars have had an average compounded investment return
rate of 11.1%, net of all management fees and expenses."l 9 With a
corporate tax rate of 35%,120 a tax on endowment investment returns could
raise substantial funds-$18 billion, according to one estimate. 121 (Some
institutions collect more in tuition and other fees than they pay out in
expenses, but the differential is usually small.) 122
Such an approach has some real advantages. First, the amount of tax will
be calibrated to the well-being of the endowment. In 2007, mega-
endowments had banner rates of returns, 21.3%.123 This year, however,
returns are likely to be negative. When the endowment is doing well, it will
pay more tax; when the endowment is doing poorly, it will owe less.
Second, unlike with the five-percent rule, universities cannot complain that
they are being forced to dip into a rainy day fund; the tax simply means that
they can accumulate less. Third, the proposal-particularly the iteration
that provides for direct revenue sharing-may help eliminate a pronounced
rich-poor gap between mega-endowment universities and their less wealthy
counterparts. In particular, the funds may allow poorer colleges to offer aid
packages that would allow them to compete for desirable students or
compensation packages that would retain up-and-coming faculty.
There are, however, reasons for Congress to proceed cautiously as it
considers whether to tax investment income. First, congressional interest is
fueled by spiraling tuition costs. As discussed previously, some
commentators have suggested that when Congress offsets the cost of tuition
(as with the HOPE tax credit), institutions respond by increasing tuition or
fees, thereby capturing the benefit for themselves.124 If Congress used a tax
on investment income to create new tuition-relief measures, or distributed
118. Allen, supra note 34.
119. 2007 ENDOWMENT STUDY, supra note 1, at 4.
120. I.R.C. § 1 l(b)(1)(D) (2006).
121. Gravelle Memorandum, supra note 14.
122. See Jeffrey Brainard, Compensation of Presidents of Private Institutions, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 21, 2008, at B20 (listing both expenditures and revenues for private
institutions).
123. 2007 ENDOWMENT STUDY, supra note 1, at 4.
124. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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funds directly to poorer schools, it is not certain that families would have
lower out-of-pocket expenses. Another concern is potential objections from
donors, who are likely to perceive investment returns as the "fruit" of their
gifts. Such donors may be interested in advancing the interests of (for
example) Harvard, and not at all concerned about the general state of higher
education. But since the federal government also subsidizes the gifts of
these donors (at least those who itemize deductions or die with substantial
wealth), donors should not have the only say in how their gifts are used.
These objections, however, suggest a part of the puzzle that has been
mostly missing from discussions about mega-endowments: the donors who
contribute to them. The next section turns to them.
D. Influencing the Behavior of Donors
Neither Congress nor commentators have identified donors as a potential
means of encouraging endowment spending, although universities have
pointed to donor restrictions as one reason why they cannot spend more. 125
The relative silence about donors is curious, as their continuing gifts are one
reason that endowments prosper. Moreover, donors directly benefit from
educational tax subsidies, because they can deduct lifetime gifts from their
annual taxable incomes and bequests from their taxable estates. 126 If
Congress wants to spur spending at mega-endowment universities, it should
enlist (or conscript) donors.
Congress has a very large carrot with which to influence donor behavior:
the charitable deduction from income and estate taxes. One possibility is
that Congress could deny a deduction for any gift to a mega-endowment
institution that does not specify that the gift must be spent within, say,
twenty-five years. 127 A revised Form 990 would provide a means of
tracking whether universities honor these time restrictions; those that did
not could pay substantial penalties. In addition, Congress could cap the
amount of deduction available for gifts that are restricted for the purchase or
construction of the kinds of assets that businesses typically depreciate, such
as buildings, machinery, or equipment. 128 These simultaneous changes
would encourage present spending and help direct donors away from gifts
that may inadvertently contribute to the rising costs of education.
Begin with a rule that would cap the deduction for gifts that contribute to
the purchase or construction of depreciable assets. As previously discussed,
some observers have concluded that some endowment gifts have the
unintended consequence of raising tuition. They point to an "edifice
125. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
126. I.R.C. § 170 (2006) (income tax deduction); id. § 2055 (discussing estate tax
deduction).
127. As a practical matter, universities (who will be eager to reassure their potential
donors of the availability of a deduction) are likely to structure giving arrangements so that
they promise to spend the gift within the specified time, unless the donor opts out.
128. See Internal Revenue Service, A Brief Overview of Depreciation,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=137026,00.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
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complex," where some major donors prefer to put their names on new
buildings that require "massive additional investment in both construction
and long-term maintenance." 129  Moreover, when a mega-endowment
institution improves its infrastructure or offers students amenities like high-
end workout facilities, dining halls, or dormitories, they fuel an arms race in
which other institutions feel compelled to make similar investments,
thereby raising their tuitions as well. 130 With a limit on the available
deduction, a university could still use donations to improve its
infrastructure, but not as easily as at present. (This is because few donors
will be willing to forgo a deduction on the sort of multi-million-dollar gifts
behind so many campus improvements). This does not mean, of course,
that mega-endowment universities will be unable to make improvements,
but they likely will have to go about it in the same way as poorer
institutions-by borrowing. This would slow the growth of physical
improvements that inadvertently raise tuitions across higher education.
Over time, such a limit on deductions also may decrease the most visible
signs of the wealth gap between rich and poor colleges.
Now take the rule that would deny a deduction unless a gift specified that
it had to be spent within twenty-five years. A requirement that a gift be
spent in the same year it is made is generally meaningless, as an institution
can simply retain other funds in its place. 13 But as the length of the time
restriction increases, such shell games become more difficult. Without the
rule that limits the deduction for gifts to depreciable assets, universities
might respond by encouraging the kinds of gifts that contribute to the
edifice complex, that is, the construction of new buildings or general
campus beautification. But in absence of that possibility, universities
would have to spend more on initiatives that would reduce tuition or
otherwise relate very directly to the educational mission. Depending on the
magnitude of the gift, universities might have to think creatively about
reaching beyond their own borders in ways that further their educational
missions.1 32 This would provide another avenue for mega-endowment
universities to reap the benefits of their wealth.
Some would argue that donors are already intimately and appropriately
involved in creating endowment spending policies. This sentiment reflects
a market-based approach to endowments: donors are aware of the enormity
of university endowments and contribute to them anyway. These
continuing contributions signal that the market for charitable gifts endorses
university policies, or at least that, despite spending policies, the market
129. See Higher Education Tax Exemptions and Incentives: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 7 (2006) (statement of James Duderstat, President Emeritus
of the University of Michigan and member of the Spellings Commission on the Future of
Higher Education).
130. Id.
131. Hansmann, supra note 54, at 35.
132. See Stephanie Strom, How Long Should Gifts Just Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2007, at HI (discussing how the Gates Foundation, which must spend multi-billion-dollar
gifts from Warren Buffet within one year, has helped build additional outlets for its money).
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finds universities more attractive than others who compete for charitable
dollars. 133 From a pure market perspective, this argument has appeal.
While there are occasional signs that universities fear the size of their
endowments will decrease alumni giving, 134 and economic research
suggests that large endowments might crowd out some gifts, 135 mega-
endowment institutions continue to launch and complete multi-billion-
dollar fundraising efforts.136 The market favors these universities enough
that the gifts keep coming in.
But this "leave-to-the-market" argument would be more powerful if
studies showed that the typical donor carefully evaluates the relationship
between a university's mission, its endowment, and its spending polices.
Instead research has suggested numerous reasons why people make
charitable gifts, very few of which involve a careful weighing of an
institution's intrinsic merits. At the simplest level, contributing to a charity
usually makes the donor feel good. This "warm glow" provides utility to
the donor and acts as an incentive to give. 137  More specific to the
university context, graduates who give to their alma maters may perceive
themselves as repaying a deferred debt with interest (or a discount) to
reflect the value of their degrees; 138 those who attend college are likely to
hear, somewhere along the way, that tuition only partially covers the cost of
an education. Donations can also serve as a means of purchasing social
status or prestige. 139 In this regard, a university is doing more than just
conveying information when it publishes a list of donors. Instead, it hopes
that alumni will purchase the ability to signal that they are civic-minded
enough to support their school or successful enough to give at a certain
level. In addition, large donations might allow donors to influence
institutional policy. 140 Donors might be particularly interested in securing
favorable admissions decisions for their children or grandchildren.
133. See, e.g., Charity Governance, http://www.charitygovemance.com/charity-
governance/2007/1 1/the-new-tax-on.html (Nov. 25, 2007, 14:56 EST).
134. See, e.g., Ben Stein, Three Cheers (and a Big Question) for Yale, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2005, at BU3 (questioning why he should give to Yale instead of poorer non-profits);
Ben Stein, All Right, Already: A Second Look at Yale, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005, at BU4
(deciding, after a barrage of mail, that he would continue to give, not because doing so was
sound economic policy, but because he "loves" Yale).
135. Sharon M. Oster, The Effect of University Endowment Growth on Giving: Is There
Evidence of Crowding Out? 16-18 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. ES-10, 2001),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/so3/papers.cfn?abstractid=271597.
136. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
137. James Andreoni, Giving with Impure Altruism, Applications to Charity and
Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. POL. EcON. 1447, 1448-49 (1989); James Andreoni, Impure
Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J.
464, 470 (1990).
138. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 233 (1996).
139. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 49-68 (2000); see also Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH L. REV. 338, 365-
66 (1997) (suggesting that in certain instances charitable giving might be necessary in order
to avoid a loss in prestige).
140. FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE 37 (1995).
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Economists from Princeton and Stanford analyzed alumni contributions at a
"selective" university and found that alumni with children gave more and
that giving increased as the children neared the age of eighteen. Giving
dropped off after the child was accepted and declined even more sharply if
the child was rejected. 14 1 Although legacy admissions are increasingly
under fire, such donations can yield the results that alumni seek. In 2002,
for instance, Texas A&M University admitted 321 students of alumni who
would not have been admitted without the help of parents' donations. 142
Of course, some donors-particularly those who give large gifts-
thoroughly evaluate their options before deciding which institution will
benefit from their largesse. These individuals often think of themselves as
more like "charitable investors" than mere donors. But sometimes the
donation to the university is a "default gift," in that a contributor wishes to
make a substantial donation and has difficulty finding organizations that
can absorb and manage a large influx of resources. 143 This sort of approach
is hardly a ringing endorsement of university endowment policies.
Some donors use charitable giving as a means of obtaining immortality,
although recent trends in philanthropy suggest that the numbers of these
kinds of donors are shrinking.144 At present, charitable gifts and their gains
can remain in an endowment long after the donor has died. Some donors
take special satisfaction in the idea that they continue to contribute or to
exert control after their deaths. But perpetual control is more a myth than a
reality. Every trusts and estates student knows about the safety valve of cy
pres, which allows a court to modify the terms of a charitable gift to
account for changed conditions. 14 5 In addition, a number of cases suggest
that charities ignore donor restrictions much more often than donors
realize.146 Moreover, a time period, such as the twenty-five years suggested
141. Higher Education Tax Exemptions and Incentives: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 109th Cong. 168-72 (2006) (Statement of Daniel Golden, Deputy Bureau Chief,
Boston Bureau, Wall Street Journal); Jonathan Meer and Harvey S. Rosen, Altruism and the
Child-Cycle of Alumni Giving (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
W 13152, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=992155.
142. Adam Liptak, A Hereditary Perk the Founding Fathers Failed to Anticipate, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, at AI2.
143. Strom, supra note 132 ("'One of the great lines from our experience was when we
were sitting with a donor who said, "I know how to give $100 million to my Ivy League
university, but I don't know how to give $100 million to help kids in the city,"' recalled H.
Peter Karoff, founder of the Philanthropic Initiative, a strategic planning and consulting firm.
'We told him he would have to hire 20 people to do that well, and he wrote his check to the
Ivy League school. Many of these huge gifts are what I call default gifts."').
144. See id. (noting the growing number of major philanthropists who require that their
gifts be spent in a short period of time).
145. UNIF. TRUST CODE, § 413, 7C U.L.A. 509 (2006).
146. See Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs.
Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REv 1093, 1094 (2005) (collecting cases and noting that
"[t]he cat is out of the bag: [d]onors are fast discovering what was once a well-kept secret in
the philanthropic sector-that a gift to public charity donated for a specific purpose and
restricted to that purpose is often used by the charity for its general operations or applied to
other uses not intended by the donor").
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here, allows donors to influence events throughout the education of both the
present generation and the next. As an actual matter, many of us have
difficulty seeing beyond that horizon. Universities, of course, will continue
to ensure that donors who value immortality have a means of appearing to
achieve it, either through naming rights for particular initiatives or through
other commemorative opportunities on campus. Finally, it is not at all clear
why donor preferences for perpetual gifts should determine congressional
policy. So long as a donor itemizes or dies with an estate that exceeds the
applicable exclusion amount, 147 the public subsidizes the charitable gift. As
such, donor judgments and preferences should not control.
The twenty-five-year spending rule and the limit on the deduction on
gifts for depreciable assets might cause some donors to reevaluate whether
to give to mega-endowment universities. But the majority of the reasons
for giving-warm glow, repayment of an implicit loan, prestige among
peers, policy-making access, and influence over admissions decisions-
would remain unchanged. Of course, institutions with super-sized
endowments will vehemently oppose any tax changes that might make them
less attractive to donors, even if such risk is low. But if some donors did
migrate away from mega-endowment institutions, society at large might
actually benefit.
To state the obvious, the United States is not lacking for 501(c)(3)
institutions that are capable of creating great good. If donors who dislike
these proposed tax changes redirect their charitable dollars, less rich (and
often financially strapped) charities are likely to benefit. Researchers who
have studied giving patterns describe "identification with the fate of others"
as the "primary variable" that explains why donors give to give charities. 148
In visual terms, donors are at the center of a series of concentric circles,
with the smallest circles representing the individuals and organizations
closest to the donor, and the larger circles representing those a bit more
removed. Donors tend to provide for those on the inner circles before
moving on to those on the outer circles.149 If a mega-endowment institution
is an inner circle and the donor desires, say, perpetual control (and a tax
deduction), she will likely move to the outer circles more quickly than she
otherwise would. The mega-endowment institution's loss is likely another
charity's gain.
CONCLUSION
With the current economic downturn and reports of steep endowment
losses, congressional interest in spending policies may seem like a relic
from healthier times. Indeed, universities are likely to point to the current
economic crisis as evidence of their wisdom-hard times come, and when
147. In 2008, an estate that is worth $2 million or less will pay no tax; in 2009, an estate
that is worth $3.5 million or less will pay no tax. I.R.C. § 2010 (Supp. V 2005).
148. Schervish & Havens, supra note 67, at 134.
149. Id. at 138.
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they do, institutions need to have saved for them. But some of the losses
help put endowment size into perspective and illustrate just how large
particular endowments have become. For instance, Yale reported that in
fiscal year 2008 its endowment had fallen 25%, to approximately $17
billion. 150 Given the expenditures reported in Table 3, its endowment-
expense ratio is likely in the range of 7:1, a number that is more than
comfortable.
When Congress returns to endowments, two factors should inform its
debate. First, the amount of endowment per full-time student is a
convenient proxy for determining which institutions have excessively large
endowments. Second, donors can play a valuable role in helping to spur the
sort of endowment spending that promotes research and helps control
tuition across the board. So long as tuition continues to trend upward and
worthy research remains unfunded, endowment spending policies are a
matter of national concern.
150. See Hoffrnan, supra note 5.
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APPENDIX 15'
Table ]: Private Institutions Ranked by 2007 Endowment Value
2007 Endowment
Rank Institution State ValueI Value
I Harvard University MA $34,634,906,000
2 Yale University CT $22,530,200,000
3 Stanford University CA $17,164,836,000
4 Princeton University NJ $15,787,200,000
5 Massachusetts Institute of $9,980,410,000
Technology
6 Columbia University NY $7,149,803,000
7 University of Pennsylvania PA $6,635,187,000
8 Northwestern University IL $6,503,292,000
9 University of Chicago IL $6,204,189,000
10 University of Notre Dame IN $5,976,973,000
11 Duke University NC $5,910,280,000
12 Washington University MO $5,567,843,000
13 Emory University GA $5,561,743,000
14 Cornell University NY $5,424,733,000
15 Rice University TX $4,669,544,000
16 Dartmouth College NH $3,760,234,000
17 University of Southern California CA $3,715,272,000
18 Vanderbilt University TN $3,487,500,000
19 Johns Hopkins University MD $2,800,377,000
20 Brown University RI $2,780,798,000
21 New York University NY $2,161,800,000
22 Williams College MA $1,892,055,000
23 California Institute of Technology CA $1,860,052,000
24 Case Western Reserve University OH $1,841,234,000
25 Pomona College CA $1,760,902,000
26 University of Rochester NY $1,726,318,000
27 Grinnell College IA $1,718,313,000
28 Boston College MA $1,670,092,000
29 Amherst College MA $1,662,377,000
30 Wellesley College MA $1,656,565,000
151. The information in these tables was gathered from the 2006 and 2007 NACUBO
endowment studies. See 2007 ENDOWMENT STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 5; 2006 ENDOWMENT
STUDY, supra note 31, pt. 5; see also supra Part I.
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2007 Endowment
Rank Institution State 2 aEoeValue
31 University of Richmond VA $1,654,988,000
32 Tufts University MA $1,452,058,000
33 Swarthmore College PA $1,441,232,000
34 Yeshiva University NY $1,409,576,000
35 Smith College MA $1,360,966,000
36 Southern Methodist University TX $1,327,816,000
37 Wake Forest University NC $1,248,695,000
38 Texas Christian University TX $1,187,057,000
39 George Washington University DC $1,147,451,000
40 Carnegie Mellon University PA $1,115,740,000
41 Berea College KY $1,102,272,000
42 Boston University MA $1,101,386,000
43 Syracuse University NY $1,086,143,000
44 Lehigh University PA $1,085,639,000
45 Georgetown University DC $1,059,343,000
46 Baylor University TX $1,018,012,000
47 Tulane University LA $1,009,129,000
48 Trinity University TX $991,112,000
49 St. Louis University MO $959,486,000
50 Middlebury College VT $936,354,000
51 University of Tulsa OK $915,320,000
52 Vassar College NY $869,122,000
53 Bowdoin College ME $827,714,000
54 Oberlin College OH $816,135,000
55 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute NY $812,996,000
56 University of Miami FL $741,382,000
57 Pepperdine University CA $734,924,000
58 Lafayette College PA $734,421,000
59 Wesleyan University CT $710,800,000
60 Colgate University NY $709,047,000
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Table 2. Private Institutions Ranked by 2007 Endowment-Expense Ratio
006-2Endowment-
Rank Institution State Endowment Expenditures Expense
Value Ratio
Grinnell IA $1,718,313,000 $104,000,000 16.52224038College
2 Berea College KY $1,102,272,000 $69,000,000 15.97495652
Pomona
3 Coe CA $1,760,902,000 $129,000,000 13.6504031llege
Princeton
UPnvety NJ $15,787,200,000 $1,200,000,000 13.156niversity
Rice
Uniei TX $4,669,544,000 $396,000,000 11.79177778niversity
6 Swarthmore PA $1,441,232,000 $132,000,000 10.91842424College
Harvard
7 University MA $34,634,906,000 $3,200,000,000 10.82340813
8 Amherst MA $1,662,377,000 $155,000,000 10.7250129College
9 University of VA $1,654,988,000 $160,000,000 10.343675
Richmond _________
10 Yale
10 Unie CT $22,530,200,000 $2,200,000,000 10.241niv rsity
11 Williams MA $1,892,055,000 $189,000,000 10.01087302College
12 Trinity TX $991,112,000 $113,000,000 8.770902655University
13 Wellesley MA $1,656,565,000 $224,000,000 7.395379464College
14 University of IN $5,976,973,000 $818,000,000 7.306812958Notre Dame
15 Bowdoin ME $827,714,000 $127,000,000 6.517433071College
16 Smith College MA $1,360,966,000 $218,000,000 6.242963303
17 Stanford
17 University CA $17,164,836,000 $3,100,000,000 5.537043871
18 Lafayette PA $734,421,000 $142,000,000 5.171978873College
19 University of OK $915,320,000 $177,000,000 5.171299435Tulsa
Vassar
20 College NY $869,122,000 $171,000,000 5.082584795
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202062007 Endowment-2007200
Rank Institution State Endowment Expenditures Expense
Value Ratio
21 Dartmouth NH $3,760,234,000 $766,000,000 4.908921671College
Oberlin
22 Olg OH $816,135,000 $178,000,000 4.58502809College
Wake Forest23 University NC $1,248,695,000 $283,000,000 4.412349823
24 Middlebury VT $936,354,000 $213,000,000 4.396028169College
25 Northwestern IL $6,503,292,000 $1,500,000,000 4.335528
____ University
Colgate26 University NY $709,047,000 $164,000,000 4.323457317
Massachusetts
27 Institute of MA $9,980,410,000 $2,400,000,000 4.158504167
Technology
Texas
28 Christian TX $1,187,057,000 $287,000,000 4.136087108
University
29 Brown
29 U n RI $2,780,798,000 $677,000,000 4.107530281niversity1
Columbia
30 University NY $7,149,803,000 $2,000,000,000 3.5749015
Wesleyan31 University CT $710,800,000 $206,000,000 3.450485437
32 University of IL $6,204,189,000 $1,800,000,000 3.446771667Chicago
33 Lehigh PA $1,085,639,000 $343,000,000 3.16512828UniversityI
Duke
34 University NC $5,910,280,000 $1,900,000,000 3.110673684
Southern
35 Methodist TX $1,327,816,000 $427,000,000 3.109639344
University
36 Washington MO $5,567,843,000 $1,800,000,000 3.093246111University
Cornell
37 University NY $5,424,733,000 $2,000,000,000 2.7123665
38 Emory GA $5,561,743,000 $2,200,000,000 2.528065University
39 Pepperdine CA $734,924,000 $298,000,000 2.466187919
University _______
Boston
40 Co MA $1,670,092,000 $688,000,000 2.427459302College
2009] 1827
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
202062007 Endowment-2000700
Rank Institution State Endowment Expenditures Expense
Value Ratio
Yeshiva
41 Uesity NY $1,409,576,000 $598,000,000 2.357150502University
Tufts
42 uvs MA $1,018,012,000 $642,000,000 2.261772586University
43 Baylor TX $1,452,058,000 $463,000,000 2.198730022
University
Case Western
44 Reserve OH $1,841,234,000 $902,000,000 2.041279379
University
45 University of PA $6,635,187,000 $3,400,000,000 1.951525588
Pennsylvania __________ _____
Rensselaer
46 Polytechnic NY $812,996,000 $424,000,000 1.917443396
Institute
University of
47 Southern CA $3,715,272,000 $2,100,000,000 1.769177143
California
48 Tulane LA $1,009,129,000 $659,000,000 1.53130349University
49 St Louis MO $959,486,000 $631,000,000 1.520580032University
50 Uirsity NY $1,086,143,000 $810,000,000 1.340917284niversity
Carnegie
51 Mellon PA $1,115,740,000 $836,000,000 1.334617225
University
52 Vanderbilt TN $3,487,500,000 $2,800,000,000 1.245535714University
George
53 Washington DC $1,147,451,000 $963,000,000 1.191537902
University
54 Georgetown DC $1,059,343,000 $928,000,000 1.141533405
University 1_1
5 University of NY $1,726,318,000 $2,000,000,000 0.863159
55_ Rochester
56 Johns Hopkins MD $2,800,377,000 $3,300,000,000 0.848599091University __________ ______
California
57 Institute of CA $1,860,052,000 $2,300,000,000 0.808718261
Technology
New York
58 University NY $2,161,800,000 $2,700,000,000 0.800666667
Universit
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2007 2006-2007 Endowment-
Rank Institution State Endowment Expenditures Expense
Value Ratio
Boston
59 University MA $1,101,386,000 $1,500,000,000 0.734257333
60 University of IFMiai FL $741,382,000 $1,700,000,000 0.436107059
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
Table 3: Private Institutions Ranked by 2007 Endowment Per Full-Time
Student
2007 Endowment Per
Rank Institution State Full-Time eFull-Time Student
I Princeton University NJ $2,228,257
2 Yale University CT $1,983,641
3 Harvard University MA $1,774,875
4 Boston College MA $1,670,092
5 Stanford University CA $1,152,776
6 Pomona College CA $1,150,165
7 Grinnell College IA $1,094,467
8 Syracuse University NY $1,086,143
9 Amherst College MA $1,003,851
10 Swarthmore College PA $974,464
11 Massachusetts Institute of MA $973,699
Technology
12 Rice University TX $946,785
13 Williams College MA $933,426
14 California Institute of CA $891,684
Technology
15 Wellesley College MA $740,530
16 Berea College KY $712,983
17 Dartmouth College NH $664,705
18 University of Notre Dame IN $519,963
19 Bowdoin College ME $478,724
20 Duke University NC $475,868
21 Washington University MO $473,738
22 University of Chicago IL $469,765
23 Emory University GA $458,511
24 Smith College MA $439,305
25 University of Richmond VA $415,513
26 Northwestern University IL $397,390
27 Middlebury College VT $392,766
28 Trinity University TX $377,998
29 Vassar College NY $362,739
30 Brown University RI $350,226
31 Columbia University NY $337,398
32 University of Pennsylvania PA $317,336
33 Lafayette College PA $315,609
34 Vanderbilt University TN $300,647
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2007 Endowment Per
Rank Institution State F0llETime eFull-Time Student
35 Oberlin College OH $289,512
36 Cornell University NY $276,222
37 Colgate University NY $255,974
38 Wesleyan University CT $234,587
39 University of Tulsa OK $233,262
40 University of Rochester NY $219,522
41 Case Western Reserve OH $215,551University OH $215,551
42 Johns Hopkins University MD $195,434
43 Yeshiva University NY $189,408
44 Wake Forest University NC $187,548
45 Lehigh University PA $176,383
46 Tufts University MA $156,861
47 Southern Methodist University TX $145,994
48 Texas Christian University TX $144,358
49 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute NY $127,329
50 Carnegie Mellon University PA $119,933
51 University of Southern CA $117,915
51_____ California
52 Tulane University LA $107,320
53 Pepperdine University CA $105,532
54 St. Louis University MO $91,896
55 Georgetown University DC $80,614
56 Baylor University TX $73,881
57 New York University NY $62,053
58 George Washington University DC $57,505
59 University of Miami FL $49,389
60 Boston University MA $44,223
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Table 4: Private Institutions Ranked by 2007 Endowment Per Full-Time
Student, with 2007 Endowment-Expense Ratios
2007
2007 Endowment
Rank Institution State Endowment- ErFl-meExpese RtioPer Full-TimeExpense Ratio Student
I Princeton University NJ 13.156 $2,228,257
2 Yale University CT 10.241 $1,983,641
3 Harvard University MA 10.82340813 $1,774,875
4 Boston College MA 2.427459302 $1,670,092
5 Stanford University CA 5.537043871 $1,152,776
6 Pomona College CA 13.6504031 $1,150,165
7 Grinnell College IA 16.52224038 $1,094,467
8 Syracuse University NY 1.340917284 $1,086,143
9 Amherst College MA 10.7250129 $1,003,851
10 Swarthmore College PA 10.91842424 $974,464
11 Massachusetts Institute of MA 4.158504167 $973,69911 ~TechnologyMA 418067 $3,9
12 Rice University TX 11.79177778 $946,785
13 Williams College MA 10.01087302 $933,426
14 California Institute of CA 0.808718261 $891,684Technology CA 0.08_ 861 $8_,8
15 Wellesley College MA 7.395379464 $740,530
16 Berea College KY 15.97495652 $712,983
17 Dartmouth College NH 4.908921671 $664,705
18 University of Notre Dame IN 7.306812958 $519,963
19 Bowdoin College ME 6.517433071 $478,724
20 Duke University NC 3.110673684 $475,868
21 Washington University MO 3.093246111 $473,738
22 University of Chicago IL 3.446771667 $469,765
23 Emory University GA 2.528065 $458,511
24 Smith College MA 6.242963303 $439,305
25 University of Richmond VA 10.343675 $415,513
26 Northwestern University IL 4.335528 $397,390
27 Middlebury College VT 4.396028169 $392,766
28 Trinity University TX 8.770902655 $377,998
29 Vassar College NY 5.082584795 $362,739
30 Brown University RI 4.107530281 $350,226
31 Columbia University NY 3.5749015 $337,398
32 University of Pennsylvania PA 1.951525588 $317,336
33 Lafayette College PA 5.171978873 $315,609
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Rank Institution State Endowment- endowmeRtoPer Full-Time
Expense Ratio Student
34 Vanderbilt University TN 1.245535714 $300,647
35 Oberlin College OH 4.58502809 $289,512
36 Cornell University NY 2.7123665 $276,222
37 Colgate University NY 4.323457317 $255,974
38 Wesleyan University CT 3.450485437 $234,587
39 University of Tulsa OK 5.171299435 $233,262
40 University of Rochester NY 0.863159 $219,522
41 Case Western Reserve OH 2.041279379 $215,551University
42 Johns Hopkins University MD 0.848599091 $195,434
43 Yeshiva University NY 2.357150502 $189,408
44 Wake Forest University NC 4.412349823 $187,548
45 Lehigh University PA 3.16512828 $176,383
46 Tufts University MA 2.261772586 $156,861
47 Southern Methodist TX 3.109639344 $145,994
University
48 Texas Christian University TX 4.136087108 $144,358
Rensselaer Polytechnic NY 1.917443396 $127,329
49_ Institute
50 Carnegie Mellon PA 1.334617225 $119,933University
51 University of Southern CA 1.769177143 $117,915CaliforniaCA 79713 7,5
52 Tulane University LA 1.53130349 $107,320
53 Pepperdine University CA 2.466187919 $105,532
54 St. Louis University MO 1.520580032 $91,896
55 Georgetown University DC 1.141533405 $80,614
56 Baylor University TX 2.198730022 $73,881
57 New York University NY 0.800666667 $62,053
58 George Washington DC 1.191537902 $57,50University DC 1.191537902 $57,505
59 University of Miami FL 0.436107059 $49,389
60 Boston University MA 0.734257333 $44,223
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Table 5: Private Institutions Ranked by 2006 Endowment Per Full-Time
Student, with 2006 Endowment-Expense Ratios
2006 2006
Rank Institution State Endowment- Endowment
Ratio Per Full-TimeStudent
1 The Rockefeller University NY 6.815208 $8,859,770
2 Princeton University NJ 11.859 $1,910,501
3 Yale University CT 9.0153 $1,589,159
4 Harvard University MA 9.638569 $1,504,616
5 Stanford University CA 4.856785 $1,070,671
6 Pomona College CA 12.45481 $952,427
7 Grinnell College IA 15.01841 $944,675
8 The Juilliard School NY 9.763029 $862,190
9 Swarthmore College PA 10.12424 $844,831
10 Amherst College MA 9.760277 $820,846
11 Massachusetts Institute of MA 3.63829 $820,399
Technology MA _ .682_$2039
12 Rice University TX 10.74573 $795,107
13 Baylor College of TX 1.059393 $779,539Medicine
14 California Institute of CA 0.75282 $728,871
Technology
15 Williams College MA 8.214219 $724,545
16 Wellesley College MA 6.957685 $627,738
17 Berea College KY 14.16027 $610,121
18 Dartmouth College NH 4.342829 $534,965
19 Emory University GA 2.319057 $409,865
20 Smith College MA 5.61335 $406,022
21 Bowdoin College ME 5.564843 $404,898
22 University of Notre Dame IN 5.717299 $392,379
23 University of Chicago IL 3.041877 $384,106
24 Bryn Mawr College PA 5.469311 $371,633
25 University of Richmond VA 9.14198 $348,877
26 Duke University NC 2.645716 $337,768
27 Middlebury College VT 3.747599 $330,564
28 Hamilton College NY 5.065362 $325,350
29 Northwestern University IL 3.671906 $320,690
30 Vassar College NY 4.635344 $316,541
31 Trinity University TX 7.474055 $303,869
32 Lafayette College PA 4.948794 $284,588
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2006 2006
Rank Institution State Endowment- Endowment
Ratio Per Full-TimeExpense RStudent
33 Columbia University NY 2.19919 $279,954
34 Washington & Lee VA 4.8914 $269,870
University VA 4.8914 _269,87
35 Brown University RI 3.277033 $268,148
36 Vanderbilt University TN 1.133228 $265,680
37 University of Pennsylvania PA 1.610081 $252,029
38 Cornell University NY 1.878782 $222,204
39 University of Tulsa OK 4.805765 $211,270
40 Wesleyan University CT 3.068124 $204,542
41 University of Rochester NY 0.828486 $195,219
42 Case Western Reserve OH 1.82069
University $186,552
43 Johns Hopkins University MD 0.758306 $179,446
44 Yeshiva University NY 2.165522 $176,263
45 Wake Forest University NC 3.964099 $157,439
46 Lehigh University PA 2.982454 $154,189
47 Texas Christian University TX 3.75038 $138,543
48 Tufts University MA 2.058903 $137,896
49 Boston College MA 2.234394 $113,222
50 CarnegieMellon PA 1.159514 $103,353University_______
51 University of Southern CA 1.532968 $99,019Calif rniaCA1526$9,9
52 Saint Louis University MO 1.332554 $79,054
53 Tulane University LA 1.127888 $74,327
54 Georgetown University DC 0.98757 $65,471
55 Baylor University TX 2.164267 $62,280
56 Syracuse University NY 1.179703 $53,620
57 New York University NY 0.70988 $52,292
58 George Washington DC 1.06134 $49,398
58_ University
59 University of Miami FL 0.413621 $41,570
60 Boston University MA 0.610678 $37,202
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Notes & Observations
